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The author of this text explores the notion of truth and its role in our ordinary thought, as well as in logical philosophical and scientific theories.

Truth --- Vérité --- Waarheid --- Truth. --- Vérité --- Conviction --- Belief and doubt --- Philosophy --- Skepticism --- Certainty --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Pragmatism --- Ethics. --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Values

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This is a major, wide-ranging history of analytic philosophy since 1900, told by one of the tradition's leading contemporary figures. The first volume takes the story from 1900 to mid-century. The second brings the history up to date. As Scott Soames tells it, the story of analytic philosophy is one of great but uneven progress, with leading thinkers making important advances toward solving the tradition's core problems. Though no broad philosophical position ever achieved lasting dominance, Soames argues that two methodological developments have, over time, remade the philosophical landscape. These are (1) analytic philosophers' hard-won success in understanding, and distinguishing the notions of logical truth, a priori truth, and necessary truth, and (2) gradual acceptance of the idea that philosophical speculation must be grounded in sound prephilosophical thought. Though Soames views this history in a positive light, he also illustrates the difficulties, false starts, and disappointments endured along the way. As he engages with the work of his predecessors and contemporaries--from Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein to Donald Davidson and Saul Kripke--he seeks to highlight their accomplishments while also pinpointing their shortcomings, especially where their perspectives were limited by an incomplete grasp of matters that have now become clear. Soames himself has been at the center of some of the tradition's most important debates, and throughout writes with exceptional ease about its often complex ideas. His gift for clear exposition makes the history as accessible to advanced undergraduates as it will be important to scholars. Despite its centrality to philosophy in the English-speaking world, the analytic tradition in philosophy has had very few synthetic histories. This will be the benchmark against which all future accounts will be measured.

Analysis (Philosophy) --- Philosophy, Modern --- Philosophie analytique --- Philosophie --- Methodology --- -Philosophy --- -Mental philosophy --- Humanities --- Philosophy --- Research --- Analysis, Linguistic (Philosophy) --- Analysis, Logical --- Analysis, Philosophical --- Analytic philosophy --- Analytical philosophy --- Linguistic analysis (Philosophy) --- Logical analysis --- Philosophical analysis --- Philosophy, Analytical --- Language and languages --- Logical positivism --- Semantics (Philosophy) --- History --- -History --- -Methodology --- -Analysis (Philosophy) --- Analysis (Philosophy). --- -Humanities --- Mental philosophy --- -Analysis, Linguistic (Philosophy) --- History of philosophy --- anno 1900-1999 --- Humanities Methodology --- Methodology - History - 20th century --- Philosophy, Modern - 20th century

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The two volumes of Philosophical Essays bring together the most important essays written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of language. Scott Soames has selected thirty-one essays spanning nearly three decades of thinking about linguistic meaning and the philosophical significance of language. A judicious collection of old and new, these volumes include sixteen essays published in the 1980's and 1990's, nine published since 2000, and six new essays. The essays in Volume 1 investigate what linguistic meaning is; how the meaning of a sentence is related to the use we make of it; what we should expect from empirical theories of the meaning of the languages we speak; and how a sound theoretical grasp of the intricate relationship between meaning and use can improve the interpretation of legal texts. The essays in Volume 2 illustrate the significance of linguistic concerns for a broad range of philosophical topics--including the relationship between language and thought; the objects of belief, assertion, and other propositional attitudes; the distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility; the nature of necessity, actuality, and possible worlds; the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori; truth, vagueness, and partial definition; and skepticism about meaning and mind. The two volumes of Philosophical Essays are essential for anyone working on the philosophy of language.

Language and languages -- Philosophy. --- Linguistics. --- Semantics. --- Language and languages --- Linguistics --- Semantics --- Formal semantics --- Semasiology --- Semiology (Semantics) --- Comparative linguistics --- Information theory --- Lexicology --- Meaning (Psychology) --- Linguistic science --- Science of language --- Philosophy --- Philosophy.

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The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings (propositions expressed), or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma. Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic intuition. As conceived here, they are cognitive-event types in which agents predicate properties and relations of things--in using language, in perception, and in nonlinguistic thought. Because of this, one's acquaintance with, and knowledge of, propositions is acquaintance with, and knowledge of, events of one's cognitive life. This view also solves the problem of "the unity of the proposition" by explaining how propositions can be genuinely representational, and therefore bearers of truth. The problem, in the traditional conception, is that sentences, utterances, and mental states are representational because of the relations they bear to inherently representational Platonic complexes of universals and particulars. Since we have no way of understanding how such structures can be representational, independent of interpretations placed on them by agents, the problem is unsolvable when so conceived. However, when propositions are taken to be cognitive-event types, the order of explanation is reversed and a natural solution emerges. Propositions are representational because they are constitutively related to inherently representational cognitive acts. Strikingly original, What Is Meaning? is a major advance.

Theory of knowledge --- Logic --- Meaning (Philosophy) --- Proposition (Logic) --- Language and logic --- Philosophy --- Semantics (Philosophy)

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Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- Antiquity --- anno 500-1499 --- anno 1500-1799 --- anno 1800-1999 --- anno 2000-2099